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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
H. L. ALLRED, DeVON J. McKEE, 
ORIN (HANK) SWAIN, JOSEPH 
WILCKEN, and ORLAN COOK, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
UNION SEED COMPANY and \ 
WAYNE MALIN, D f nd t e e an s, 
UNION SEED COMPANY, A ll t ppe an. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are not in dispute. 
Case No. 
8867 
Wayne Malin, one of the defendants in the case, had 
established a retail outlet for farmers' supplies, prior to 
1950. He operated under the name of Roosevelt Flour Mill, 
and sold supplies to the Plaintiffs. He owned his own 
warehouse (Finding of Fact No. 2). 
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In 1950, Malin became a special agent for Union Seed 
Company, authorized to buy seed for his principal. He acted 
in such capacity until the spring of 1956. During this period 
of time Malin was duly licensed by the State Department of 
Agriculture as a commission agent to buy seed for Union 
Seed Company, and held himself out, and notified the grow-
ers in his area, including the Plaintiffs that he was buying 
seed for Appellant, Union Seed Company (Finding of Fact 
No.3). 
Union Seed Company furnished Malin with a "clipper" 
for rough cleaning seed, and furnished bags to Malin for 
which a charge was made, but credit given if the bags were 
returned. Malin did not charge the farmers for the bags, 
if the seed was sold to Union Seed Company, otherwise a 
charge was made (Finding of Fact No. 4). 
Union Seed Company furnished Malin with draft books 
and authorized and directed him to draw drafts on Union 
Seed Company in payment of seed purchased (Finding of 
Fact No. 15) . Samples of seed were sent to Union Seed 
Company, where the seed was analized for purity, and a 
purchase price given to Malin for acceptance by the grower. 
Upon acceptance the seed would be shipped to the Union 
Seed Company, and the growers, at times, would help load 
the seed on the trucks for shipment. Most of the plaintiffs 
sold seed to Union Seed Company in this manner andre-
ceived drafts in payment from Malin (Finding of Fact No. 
5 and 6). 
About three years prior to the trial (sometime in 1953) 
some of the farmers desired to obtain their money sooner 
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than the four or five days necessary for the drafts to reach 
Burley, Idaho. Wayne Malin, the agent, therefore started 
issuing his personal check in payment of the seed bought, 
(Tr. 39) and drew a draft to his own order and deposited 
the draft to his bank account, thereby enabling the grower 
to obtain immediate cash. This procedure to facilitate cash 
payment was approved by Union Seed Company's manager. 
Advance payments, partial payments and payments in full 
were made in this fashion (Finding of Fact No. 10). Later 
Malin drew drafts in this manner for his own convenience 
as well as for the convenience of the growers. Some of the 
plaintiffs would also accept merchandise from Malin's plant 
in payment of seed ( Tr. P. 75) . 
The drafts which Malin drew to his order, as well as 
those drawn to the order of the grower, showed the name 
of grower, the lot number of the seed, and Malin's commis-
sion (Findings of Fact No. 8 and 9). 
Malin's authority was that he was to pay in full for 
the seed when purchase was made, and he could make ad-
vances to farmers on contemplated purchases (Finding of 
Fact No. 15) (Answer to Interrogatories No.6). 
Commencing in the year 1954, some of the plaintiffs 
delivered seed to Malin as agent for Union Seed Company, 
and in many instances accepted advances and partial pay-
ment by Wayne Malin's check. The seed was sent to Union 
Seed Company, except for a few items sold locally or to 
Northrup King Company, in the regular course of business 
procedure, and drafts were drawn by Malin to himself as 
payee, in full payment. Malin failed to pay the balance of 
the purchase price to the grower (Finding of Fact No. 10). 
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In about 1954, some of the growers who delivered seed 
to Malin wanted a better price than Union Seed offered, 
so rejecting this offer, they instructed Malin to hold the 
seed for a better price. Later Malin sold the seed, some to 
Union Seed Company, some to others, without telling the 
growers he had sold it. When inquiry was made by the 
growers, Malin told them it was in his warehouse, or being 
cleaned, or held at the Union Seed plant in Burley, Idaho. 
Many of these growers accepted advances or partial pay-
ments from Malin, by his personal check on the seed they 
left with him to sell at a better price (Tr. Page 29, 41 to 
57 inc. and Finding of Fact No. 11). 
The Appellant, Union Seed Company, paid in full for 
all seed it ever received by draft payable either to the 
grower or Wayne Malin. 
No grower testified, and no evidence was introduced, 
that any plaintiff ever inquired of the Union Seed Company 
about the seed or payment for the seed, although some of 
the transactions go back nearly two years before the Com-
plaint was filed. 
The payments made by Malin and accepted by the 
plaintiffs appear on Pages 75, 83 and 85 of the transcript 
of record. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS MEM-
ORANDUM OPINION (RECORD P. 64) AND 
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IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 16 IN FIND-
ING THAT WAYNE MALIN CONVERTED 
PLAINTIFF'S SEED AND THAT UNION SEED 
COMPANY IS LIABLE FOR THE VALUE OF 
THE SEED BECAUSE OF CONVERSION. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
THAT WAYNE MALIN ACTED BEYOND THE 
SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY AS A SPECIAL 
AGENT WHEN HE MADE CREDIT PUR-
CHASES, AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE 
R E S P 0 N D E N T S WAIVED ANY CLAIM 
AGAINST APPELLANT BY NOT DEMANDING 
AND OBTAINING PAYMENT IN FULL AT 
TIME OF SALE. 
POINT 3 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE ESTOPPED 
FROM ASSERTING ANY CLAIM AGAINST 
APPELLANT. 
A. AS TO ALL RESPONDENTS. 
B. AS TO THOSE WHO HAD AGENT HOLD 
THE SEED FOR SPECULATION. 
POINT 4 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
APPELLANT LIABLE FOR CONVERSION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MONEY BY WAYNE MALIN. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS MEM-
ORANDUM OPINION (RECORD P. 64) AND 
IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 16 IN FIND-
ING THAT WAYNE MALIN CONVERTED 
PLAINTIFF'S SEED AND THAT UNION SEED 
COMPANY IS LIABLE FOR THE VALUE OF 
THE SEED BECAUSE OF CONVERSION. 
The court found the Appellant, Union Seed Company, 
liable to the respondents on the theory of a conversion of 
the seed by Wayne Malin, Appellants' Agent. Such finding 
is not only not supported by the evidence, but is contrary 
to the evidence. 
All of the plaintiffs knew Malin was the agent of Ap-
pellant for the purpose of buying seed. All of them had 
delivered seed to him for purchase in prior years, and had 
received payment for the seed so delivered, either by draft 
drawn by Malin on Union Seed, or by his personal check. 
All of them delivered the seed, the subject of this suit, to 
Malin, as "Commission Agent" for Appellant for sale of 
the seed. The only evidence that offering price was not 
acceptable are as to those few respondents, named and dis-
cussed in Point 3 this brief. Most of the respondents ask 
for and accepted advances or part payment for the seed 
so delivered. Indeed some of the original plaintiffs were 
dismissed from the suit when the evidence showed they had 
been paid in full by Malin. Some of the Plaintiffs helped 
load the seed on the trucks for shipment to Union Seed 
Company. 
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The past dealing between the parties and this evidence 
shows conclusively, the plaintiffs surrendering title to the 
seed when the seed was delivered and price ascertained in 
the usual and customary manner that they had followed 
for years. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, states the law in this jur-
isdiction as follows: 
60-2-2. "(1) Where there is a contract to sell 
specific or ascertained goods, the property in them 
is transferred to the buyer at such time as the 
parties to the contract intend it to be transferred." 
"(2) For the purpose of ascertaining 
the intention of the parties to the contract regard 
shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct 
of the parties, usages of the trade and the circum-
stances of the case." 
60-2-3. "Unless a different intention appears, 
the following rules for ascertaining the intention of 
the parties as to the time at which the property in 
the goods is to pass to the buyer : 
"Rule (1) Where there is an unconditional con-
tract to sell specific goods in a deliverable state, the 
property in the goods passes to the buyer when the 
contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the 
time of payment, or the time of delivery, or both, is 
postponed." 
"Rule ( 4) (b) . Where in pursuance of a con-
tract to sell the seller delivers the goods to the buyer, 
or to a carrier or other bailee (whether named by 
the buyer or not) for the purpose of transmission 
to or holding for the buyer, he is presumed to have 
unconditionally appropriated the goods to the con-
tract, except in the cases provided for in the next 
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rule and in Section 60-2-4. (Neither exception is 
applicable in this case.) This presumption is ap.:. 
plicable although by the terms of the contract the 
buyer is to pay the price before receiving delivery 
of the goods, and the goods are marked 'collect on 
delivery' or their equivalents." (The first above 
parenthesis are mine.) 
Williston states the rule as follows: Williston on Sales 
' Revised Edition, Chapter 343, Page 330 : 
"The general rule of the modern law of sales is 
almost precisely the opposite of the old rule. The 
modern rule is merely one of presumption and is 
expressed in the Sales Act in these words : 'Where 
there is an unconditional contract to sell specific 
goods, in a deliverable state, the property in the 
goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, 
and it is immaterial whether the time of payment or 
the time of delivery, or both, be postponed'. The 
authorities sustaining this rule have been previously 
considered. They show that while under the old law 
the property could not pass without payment or 
credit or delivery, it is now presumed to pass, irre-
spective of any agreement for credit. The seller's 
lien protects the seller from giving up his goods be-
fore he receives the price, while formerly the reten-
tion of title served the same purpose. It is still the 
presumption, where nothing is said about time of 
payment, that no credit is intended, but the conclu-
sion is drawn that until payment the seller has a 
lien only, instead of property in the goods." (Of 
course, the lien is lost when seller surrenders pos-
session of the goods. UCA 1953, Section 60-4-2.) 
Deli very to a third person under buyers designation 
of such person for the purpose is tantamount to delivery 
to buyer and is effectual to pass title to buyer. Claypool 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
vs. Mills Standard Garage, 30 P. 2d 89, Fergus County 
Hardware Co. vs. Crowley, 57 Montana 340, 188 Pac. 374. 
Seller may waive payment in cash and if delivery is 
made with such intention, it has the effect of passing title 
and places the transaction on the same basis of any other 
sale on credit. Kemper Grain Co. vs. Harlow, 89 Kan. 824, 
133 P. 565. Frech vs. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141, 67 Atl. 45, 120 
Am. St. Reports 864, Annotated at Page 868. 
The facts conclusively establish that the growers de-
livered the seed to buyer's agent in the same manner as 
previous transactions. That they knew the seed was to be 
sent to the Appellant, that they sometimes helped load the 
seed for shipment, that they had done this in the past and 
were familiar with the procedure and custom, that advance 
payments and partial payments were accepted by many 
of them, and they knew Appellant's agent had full authority 
and the means supplied by the Appellant for paying in full. 
To hold that Appellant's agent converted the seed is to fly 
in the face of the custom, the past practices of the growers, 
and the facts. 
Even those few (see point 3) who ask the agent to hold 
the seed for a better price, left the agent with authority to 
sell and transfer title, since they game him authority to sell. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
THAT WAYNE MALIN ACTED BEYOND THE 
SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY AS A SPECIAL 
AGENT WHEN HE MADE CREDIT PUR-
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CHASES, AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE 
R E S P 0 N D E N T S WAIVED ANY CLAIM 
AGAINST APPELLANT BY NOT DEMANDING 
AND OBTAINING PAYMENT IN FULL AT 
TIME OF SALE. 
Section 60-6-3 U. C. A. 1953, states: 
"In any case not provided for in this title the 
rules of law and equity, including the law merchant, 
and in particular the rules relating to the law of 
principal and agent, * * * shall continue to ap-
ply to contracts to sell and to sales of goods." 
The evidence is that Malin, the Agent, was at all times 
supplied with draft books to pay for the seed he purchased 
for Union Seed Company. The court found that the Agent, 
Malin, was directed by the principal, Appellant, to pay the 
full purchase price for the seed bought (Findings of Fact 
15) ; that in order to facilitate cash payment to the grower, 
Malin was authorized to issue drafts to his order to cover 
his personal checks to grower in payment of seed purchased. 
There is no evidence that the Appellant ever authorized, or 
knew, of a credit purchase. There is no evidence that Ap-
pellant knew, or could have known, that the growers had 
not been paid in full. 
The authority of an Agent to buy on credit is stated in 
2 Am. Jur. Sec. 112, P. 93. 
"As a general rule, if a principal authorizes his 
agent to buy goods only for cash and furnishes the 
agent with money to make payment therefor, he is 
not liable for the value of the goods purchased by 
the agent on the credit of the principal. This is 
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substantially in accord with the principles laid down 
by the American Law Institute. Moreover, the fact 
that the principal received and used the goods will 
not necessarily render him liable for the price if it 
appears that he did so without notice that the pur-
chase was on credit. Under the rule stated, if a 
purchaser, at the time of a sale, directs the seller to 
deliver the goods to the purchaser's agent, to whom 
he has given the money to pay cash, the seller, by 
taking the personal check of such agent in part pay-
ment on the delivery of goods, thereby discharges the 
debt of the purchaser in full and accepts the check 
at his peril." 
"However, according to both the decided cases 
and the Restatement of the Law of Agency, although 
express authority is not given to an agent to buy on 
credit and he is merely authorized to make the pur-
chase, he is, by implication, if no funds are furnished 
him to enable him to buy for cash, clearly authorized 
to purchase upon the credit of his principal upon 
usual or reasonable terms; this is for the recognized 
reason that when an agent is authorized to do an 
act for his principal, all the means necessary to ac-
complish the act are impliedly included in the author-
ity. Moreover, a principal who received and uses 
the goods, knowing that he has not furnished the 
cash with which to buy them, is liable at least for 
the value of the goods to the seller. If the agent has 
ostensible authority to purchase on credit, secret 
limitations on his authority in this respect are not 
effectual so far as concerns the rights of third per-
son selling to the agent in good faith." (Underscor-
ing ours.) 
MECHEM ON AGENCY-Second Edition, Vol. I. Sec. 
914, Page 652. 
"An agent authorized to purchase goods, who 
is supplied with funds for that purpose, and who has 
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not been held out as having a more general author-
ity, has no implied authority to bind his principal 
by a purchase on the principal's credit, and in such 
a case the principal will not be bound by a purchase 
on credit, although the goods come in fact to his use, 
unless he has knowledge of the fact and does some-
thing in ratification of it, or unless there be shown 
a custom of trade or a course of dealing justifying 
a purchase on the principal's credit. Mere authority 
to buy does not imply authority to buy on credit." 
To the same effect is 2 C. J. S. Sec. 114(c), Page 
1312, 1313. 
Directly in point, is the case of Americus Oil Co. vs. 
Gurr, 114 Ga. 624, 40 S. E. 780, 1902. 
The facts as stated by Court, were: 
"An action was brought in the Superior Court 
of Sumter County by W. H. Gurr against Americus 
Oil Company for the price of certain cotton seed. 
There was a verdict for the Plaintiff, and the defen-
dant complains here of the Court's refusal to grant 
it a new trial. The theory of the Plaintiff was that 
he sold the seed to one Ward, as agent of the de-
fendant; that it received the seed, and was there-
fore liable to him for the price thereof." 
Held : Judgment reversed. 
"We reverse the judgment rendered in this case 
because it was contrary to law. The Plaintiff failed 
entirely to show that Ward was the general agent 
of the defendant company, or that he had authority 
to buy seed upon ib~ credit. It clearly and distinctly 
appears from the evidence as a whole (and there is 
no evidence to the contrary) that the arrangement 
between the company and Ward was for him to buy 
seed and ship the same to the company; he in each 
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instance to pay for the seed purchased, with cash 
furnished him for this purpose by the company. His 
agency was thus limited, and Gurr, in dealing with 
him, was bound, at his peril, to know exactly what 
authority Ward had in the premises. It is too well 
settled to require citation of authority that one who 
deals with a special agent must ascertain for him-
self the scope and extent of the agent's authority to 
bind his principal. There is not one line of testimony 
in the record before us which would warrant a find-
ing that the oil company contemplated or intended 
that Ward should have any other authority, except 
to buy for it, with the cash supplied to him, the 
cotton seed which the company needed in its busi-
ness. The fact that it actually received the seed 
which were delivered by Gurr to Ward did not make 
it liable to the farmer under the doctrine of ratifi-
cation. It did not know of or sanction Ward's pur-
chase on credit, and had, in point of fact, furnished 
him with more than enough cash to pay for the seed 
he obtained from Gurr. The verdict returned by the 
jury necessarily embraced a finding that Ward was 
authorized to buy seed on credit, and makes the com-
pany liable to the seller; and this finding is wholly 
unsupported." 
While this is an early case, that it is still good law is 
established by its having been cited with approval in later 
cases-and this rule is stated in texts and authorities. 
WHEELER vs. McQUIRE, SCOGGINS-86 Ala. 398, 
404. 
Defendants' agent conducted retail store for Defen-
dant? Did agent have authority to purchase on credit when 
funds to pay cash were made available? Held-No. 
"When an express authority is given, the extent 
thereof must be ascertained from its terms ; and 
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another or different authority can not be implied, 
unless facts are shown from which such other au-
thority may be presumed, or arises by implication 
of law. Therefore, proof of facts or circumstances 
from which the authority is presumed or arises by 
implication of law-an appearance of authority, 
caused not by the agent himself, but by the defen-
dant-is essential to his, (defendant) liability for 
Tatham's (the agent) acts, not within the scope of 
his commission. In such case, it is incumbent upon 
the plaintiff to prove that defendant, by ratification, 
assent, or acquiescence in previous acts, held out 
Tatham (Agent) as clothed in the character in 
which he assumed to act, which fairly led the plain-
tiffs to believe that more extensive powers had in 
fact been given, than were conferred by the terms 
of the appointment. * * * It should, however, 
be remarked, that in order to bind the defendant by 
ratification, assent, or acquiescence in prior acts of 
his agent in excess of the authority actually given, 
knowledge of the material facts must be brought 
home to the defendant. And, if, in the absence of 
express authority to bind defendant in the manner 
in which he is sought to be charged, his liability is 
rested on previous recognition of similar acts of 
Tatham as his agent, it is requisite to show that 
plaintiffs sold the goods to Tatham (agent) on the 
faith of such previous recognition." 
P. 406: 
"A principal is not required to distrust his 
agent. He may act on the presumption that third 
parties, dealing with his agent, will not be negligent 
in ascertaining the extent of his authority, as well as 
the existence of his agency. And negligence to con-
stitute a ground of liability, must have caused the 
plaintiffs to repose trust on the authority of Tatham 
(agent) and the negligence of plaintiffs must not 
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have proximately contributed to the loss." (Brackets 
and italics mine.) 
TAFT vs. BAKER-100 Mass. 68. 
Sylabus-
In an action for the price of goods sold on defendant's 
credit to his agent, in which defendant contends that the 
purchase of goods on credit was not within the scope of the 
agency, evidence is admissible to show that the agent was 
always in funds, either from the business itself which was 
the subject of the agency, or from the defendant, sufficient 
to pay cash for all his purchases. (Italics mine.) 
MORGAN vs. GEORGIA PAVING & CONSTRUC-
TION C0.-149 S. E. 426, Ga. 1929 (citing with approval 
Americus Oil Co. vs. Gurr, supra.). 
"A person having authority from another to use 
the other's name in making cash purchases for the 
latter has no authority, as the latter's agent to make 
purchases and pledge his principal's credit for their 
payment." 
Restatement of the Law of Agency-Sec. 65, Page 159, 
states the law as follows: 
"(2) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to 
purchase includes: 
"(a) if the principal supplies the funds, 
authority to buy for money only and not on 
credit; or 
"(b) if the principal does not supply the 
funds, authority to pledge his credit upon usual 
or reasonable terms." 
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Under the facts of this case, the growers waived pay-
ment on delivery, without the knowledge of the Appellant, 
and against his express direction, and voluntarily substi-
tuted therefor, Malin's, the agent's, personal credit. 
Where goods are sold to be paid for in cash on delivery, 
if delivery made without demand of cash, prima facie pre-
sumption is that the condition is waived. Comer vs. Gun,. 
ningham, 77 N.Y. 391, 33 Am. Rep. 626. 
POINT 3 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE ESTOPPED 
FROM ASSERTING ANY CLAIM AGAINST 
APPELLANT. 
A. AS TO ALL RESPONDENTS. 
B. AS TO THOSE WHO HAD AGENT HOLD 
THE SEED FOR SPECULATION. 
A. 
The Appellant honored drafts in regular course of 
business in full payment of all the seed it received. Appel-
lant paid timely in good faith. Not one plaintiff testified 
he ever inquired of the Appellant whether Malin could make 
a credit purchase. Not one plaintiff testified he called 
Appellant's attention to the fact that he, the grower, hadn't 
been paid in full, or complained that he hadn't been paid 
in full. 
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Although these transactions were over a two year. per-
iod, not one grower testified it was called to the Appellant's 
attention. No opportunity to correct or sanction what the 
growers and Malin were doing was given to Appellant. The 
growers by not calling the Appellant's attention to the fact 
that they had not been paid in full permitted the situation 
to accumulate and grow until the Agent was bankrupt. 
Illustrative of this are cases of Huber and Hamblin. 
Hamblin's seed (valued at $3819.77 on which he received 
payment of $1700.00) was shipped in December 1954, and 
drafts in full payment honored by Appellant in December 
1954. Huber's seed (valued at $1760.22, on which he re-
ceived payment of $1300.00) was shipped in December 1954, 
and drafts honored in full payment at that time. Yet it was 
not until the complaint was filed in May 1956, that Appel-
lant had any knowledge that they, or any other plaintiff, 
had not been paid in full. 
Respondents Cook and Wilcken accepted from Malin, 
the agent, retail seed and fertilizer in part payment for the 
seed they sold. Retail sales of seed and fertilizer were no 
part of Appellant's business. 
The above conduct illustrates the respondents looked to 
Malin personally for payment of the seed. Otherwise they 
would have demanded of Appellant, or notified it of the 
unpaid balance. 
CLEVELAND vs. PEARL-63 Vt. 127, 21 Atl. 261 
(1891). 
Defendant agreed to buy wool from Plaintiff, who was 
to deliver it to defendant's agent and receive cash payment. 
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Defendant left cash with his agent. Plaintiff accepted part 
cash and agent's personal check for balance. Agent's check 
was no good. Plaintiff sued defendant. 
Held: Plaintiff accepting agent's personal check, ac-. 
cepted the credit and responsibility of the agent, instead of 
the defendant principal. 
Also held that Plaintiff's delay in presenting check for 
payment, was to the detriment of the principal since timely 
knowledge of the transaction would have permitted the 
principal to rectify the situation before making settlement 
with his agent. 
MORGAN vs. GEORGIA PAVING & CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY-149 S. E. 426 Ga., 1929. 
"Where one with knowledge of the agent's au-
thority to bind his principal, deals with the agent di-
rectly, and not with the principal, he cannot hold 
the principal liable." 
As said in Harrison vs. Auto Securities Co., et al., 70 
Utah 11, 257 P. 677, 1927, where one of two innocent parties 
must suffer from the wrongful acts of a third person, that 
loss should fall upon the one, who by his conduct created the 
circumstances which enabled the third party to perpetrate 
the wrong. 
Union Seed Company honored drafts in full payment, 
under a procedure set up to facilitate cash payments, be-
lieving all growers had been fully paid. Not one grower said 
a word which would indicate to Union Seed Company they 
hadn't been paid in full. Yet the Plaintiffs knew they 
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:hadn't been paid-some for a period of 1112 years. Who but 
Union Seed Company is the innocent party? Who but the 
Plaintiffs had the knowledge (for 1112 years) that would 
have corrected the situation? No, the Plaintiffs, instead of 
spending 3c for a letter to Union Seed Company, relied upon 
Malin for payment, just as the facts proved, they intended 
to do from the moment they delivered the seed to him. 
As stated in 2 Am. Jur. Page 93, Sec. 112, * * * 
Under the rule stated, if a purchaser; at the time of sale, 
directs the seller to deliver the goods to the purchaser's 
agent, to whom he has given the money to pay cash, the 
seller, by taking the personal check of such agent in part 
payment on delivery, thereby discharges the debt of the 
purchaser in full and accepts the check at his peril. 
Williston on Sales, Revised Ed., Vol. 2, Section 312, P. 
242, states: 
"If the owner is by his conduct precluded from 
denying the seller's authority to sell, the buyer may 
acquire a valid title although the seller had neither 
title nor authority to transfer title. * * * In 
order to give rise to an estoppel, it is essential that 
the party estopped shall have made a representation 
by words or acts on the estoppel and that some one 
shall have acted on the faith of this representation 
in such a way that he cannot without damage with-
draw from the transaction. 
"Other cases in the law of sales which present 
questions of estoppel to deny the validity of a trans-
fer of title by one not authorized to make a transfer 
may be summarized under two headings: Apparent 
ownership, and apparent authority. In both classes 
of cases, the possession of the goods by the seller 
with the permission of the owner is generally an 
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important element. In the former class of cases the 
owner of goods has entrusted possession to another 
under such circumstances that the possession 
amounts to a representation that the possessor is 
the owner of the goods. Cases fall within the latter 
class under circumstances where the doctrine of ap. 
parent authority of an agent is applicable, * * *." 
See also Sections 315, 316 and 317, where possession 
together with indicia of title is given to another. 
In this case, respondents voluntarily delivered posses-
sion of the seed to one who had bought from them before, 
knowing that Appellant was relying upon him to obtain 
seed for his business, and accepted both advances on the 
purchase price and partial payment of the seed, and never 
notified Appellant until suit was brought that they had not 
been paid in full. 
B. 
The following are the respondents who refused Appel-
lant's offering price and directed Malin to hold the seed 
for a higher price. 
Kenneth Myers, John H. Cook & Sons, John G. Hack-
ing, Dougles Bryant, Joseph Page, Bill Patry, and Clarence 
Winegar. 
Williston on Sales, Revised Edition, Volume 2, Section 
317, Page 253, dealing with transfer of title, quoting Re-
statement of Agency, as follows: "(2) The principal is 
affected in his interests by a transaction of the same kind 
as that authorized if it is conducted in the usual course of 
business by an agent dealing in such chattels with one who 
reasonably believes that the agent is authorized". 
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The plaintiffs leaving the seed with Malin for "a better 
price" cannot deny his authority to transfer title when they 
knew Malin's commission was to buy for the Appellant, that 
Appellants made an offer, and that Appellant must rely 
upon Malin's possession of the goods as evidence of the 
bona-fide of the transaction. 
Malin's authority was to buy seed at a price quoted to 
him by Union Seed Company. When the above growers re-
fused to accept this price, Malin's authority as an agent of 
Union Seed Company ended. When they told Malin to hold 
the seed for them pending a favorable market, Malin was 
acting as the representative of the grower. What he did 
after that with the seed is between Malin and the grower. 
The law of Agency cannot be stretched to permit a 
seller to refuse a buyer's price, and by collusion with agent 
speculate on a better price and then hold the principal liable 
when all does not turn out as the seller hoped. This is ex-
actly what the growers were doing. We do not say this was 
fraud-since the grower had a right to refuse to sell at the 
offered price. What we contend is, that, Malin, from the 
time the grower told him to hold the seed for a better price, 
was acting for and on behalf of the grower. When Malin 
sold and delivered seed, whether to Union Seed Company 
or Northrup King, or anyone else, he acted for the grower 
and that being his business he had every indicia of owner-
ship. 
Union Seed Company paid in full for any of such seed 
which was sent to it. The drafts payable to Malin, were 
payments to the person who left the seed in his possession 
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to hold for a better price. Since the grower left the seed 
in Malin's possession to sell, Uni-on Seed Company was a 
bona-fide good faith purchaser, and has paid in full. 
2 Am. Jur. Sec. 98, Page 80. 
"Every agency is subject to the legal limitation 
that it cannot be used for the benefit of the agent 
himself, or of any person other than the principal, 
in the absence of an agreement that it may be so 
used. This is a rule of law of which all persons must 
take notice. Whenever it appears that the interests 
of an agent and those of his principal are necessar-
ily in opposition in a particular transaction, stran-
gers dealing with the agent are charged with notice 
of his want of authority to bind the principal by 
his acts. In perverting his powers to his own per-
sonal ends and purposes, an agent acts in excess of 
his authority, and persons who knowingly partici-
pate in such act of perversion, as by purchasing the 
principal's property with knowledge that the agent 
intends to convert the proceeds to his own use, are 
not protected by the authority conferred on the 
agent." (Italics ours.) 
See Arnold vs. Somers, 92 Vt. 512, 105 A. 260, 1918. 
The same rule, stated in 2 Am. Jur. Sec. 98, is also 
found in Mechem on Agency, 2nd Ed., Section 1191, and 
quoted with approval in Brozcn vs. Halston, 277 Ala. 225, 
149 So. 690, 691; 1933. 
Plaintiffs knew Malin was authorized to buy only at 
the price quoted, when they ask him to hold the seed, they 
acted at their peril, since his authority was to buy only at 
the price quoted, and they knew he was acting outside the 
scope of his authority. 2 C. J. S. Sec. 114 (b), Page 1311. 
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MORGAN vs. GEORGIA PAVING & CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY-149 S. E. 426, Ga., 1929. 
"It is only where an act is done for and in be-
half of another that it can be ratified by the latter's 
acceptance of the benefits accruing to him there-
under, and then only with knowledge of the facts." 
The Plaintiffs and Malin were the only ones who knew, 
until after the Complaint was filed, that this seed had been 
held at Plaintiffs' direction in hope of obtaining a better 
price. 
"The rule which charges the principal with 
what the agent knows is for the protection of inno-
cent third persons, and not those who use the agent 
to further their own frauds upon the principal." 
National Life Insurance Co. vs. Minch, 53 N. Y. 144, 
150, as quoted in 3 C. J. S. 204, Sec. 270. 
The law applicable to Plaintiffs in Category 3, is suc-
cinctly stated in the Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. vs. Meidinger, 
281 Ky. 225, 135 S. W. 2nd 433, 1940, sylabus 3. 
"One who induces an agent to betray his prin-
cipal should not be permitted to profit by the be-
~rayal." 
All of the respondents fall into one or more of the fol-
lowing categories which estop them from asserting any 
claim against the Appellant. 
1. They were grossly negligent of their own accounts 
and by such negligence misled the Appellant into 
believing they had been paid in full so that he con-
tinued honoring drafts in payment of their seed. 
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2. They voluntarily accepted Malin's credit (including 
part payment) as the basis for their payment, in 
the place of Appellant's known offered drafts. 
3. They conspired with the agent against principal in 
the hope of obtaining a better price than the prin-
cipal was paying, and left the goods with authority 
to sell with one whose customary business was ob-
taining such goods for a principal. 
POINT 4 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
APPELLANT LIABLE FOR CONVERSION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MONEY BY WAYNE MALIN. 
The Court in its Conclusion of Law No. 3 concludes 
that Malin "fraudulently converted their (the Plaintiffs) 
seed andjor money" and paragraph 3 of the Decree says 
"Malin * * * converted either the seed or the money 
belonging to the plaintiffs". The last two phrases of para-
graph 15 of the Findings of Fact (page 123 of the record) 
indicates l\ialin converted Plaintiff's money. 
Appellant is at a loss to understand what the Court 
means by this "and;or" Finding. However, if the trial 
court means that Malin converted Plaintiff's money, then 
obviously its judgment against Appellant is erroneous, since 
the Finding presupposes that Plaintiffs have already been 
paid in full for the seed and no claim would lie against 
Appellant for an embezzlement by Malin of Plaintiff's 
money. 
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Malin did act, as agent for the plaintiffs named in 
Point 3 B, and under the facts he could have been the agent 
of all of the plaintiffs in so far as receiving payment for 
the seed was concerned. If this is what the trial court means 
by its above Finding, Conclusion and Decree, then its judg-
ment against Appellant is patently in error. 
No principal is liable for embezzlement of another's 
money by an agent, since it is outside the scope of his 
authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondents have judgment against Wayne Malin, 
the agent, for the full amount of their claims. In good faith, 
the Appellant has already paid, and paid timely, for all the 
seed it ever received from the respondents. In view of the 
custom, the grossly negligent conduct of the respondents in 
this matter, and the law as herein set forth, it respectfully 
submitted that Appellant should not be required to pay 
twice for the seed. 
It is respectfully submitted the judgment of the Trial 
Court against the Appellant should be reversed, and the 
Trial Court directed to enter judgment in favor of the Ap-
pellant, No Cause of Action. 
HERBERT F. SMART, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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